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FOREWORD
Cyberspace operations have become pervasive
in the United States, and they enable many aspects
of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation,
banking, and voting. The continuing development
of Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve
component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to
help protect critical information infrastructure and
enhance national security. What opportunities and
challenges surround the integration of these forces into
a still-evolving joint cyberspace force?
In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton argues that
current efforts to integrate Reserve cyber components
appear to be sufficient for certain specific applications,
but the Nation has yet to benefit from the potential
synergy offered by an optimized blend of these capabilities. He admits that some issues identified in his
monograph may be common to other applications of
Reserve component forces, but emphasizes that the
negative impacts may be more significant for cyber
units due to the ethereal nature of cyberspace operations that are far less intuitive than those occurring in
the physical world.
Mr. Caton offers recommendations for policymakers and senior leaders toward improving the integration
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and utilization of Army Reserve component cyberspace forces for both state and federal applications.
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SUMMARY
The legacy of the Citizen Soldier concept in the
United States predates the U.S. Constitution. Today,
those serving in the oldest form of service to our Nation
are called upon to address one of the newest manifestations of warfare in the realm of military cyberspace
operations. What capabilities can Reserve component
forces bring to Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace forces? What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving
joint cyberspace force? What are the expectations for
cyber forces that serve in a militia capacity?
This monograph explores these questions in four
major sections. The first section provides a concise
review of basic information on the laws and policies
governing the use of Reserve component forces. The
second section explores the uses of Reserve component
cyber forces from a DoD perspective, focusing on the
current strength and organization of Army National
Guard (ARNG) and Reserve cyber forces and their
use as part of the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF). It also
addresses responsibilities for defense support to civil
authorities and related operational issues, training and
exercise opportunities, and total force challenges. The
third section examines the use of ARNG cyber forces
from the perspective of a state government, emphasizing the expectations of governors for state incident
response and cybersecurity support. This section also
addresses military-private partnerships, state-sponsored cyber ranges and exercises, and international
partnerships. In the final section, the author offers recommendations to policymakers and leaders toward
improving the integration and utilization of Army
Reserve component cyberspace forces.
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This monograph was written to serve as a primer
for senior policymakers, decision-makers, and military
leaders at the federal and state levels on the current
status of the integration of Army Reserve component forces into U.S. military cyberspace operations.
The contents herein are limited to the presentation of
unclassified and open source information available
before November 2017. The monograph includes recommendations related to the planning and exercising
of cyber incident response activities, the cataloging and
prioritizing of Reserve component cyberspace capabilities, and the development and support of cyber training ranges.
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EXAMINING THE ROLES OF ARMY RESERVE
COMPONENT FORCES IN MILITARY
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
The legacy of the Citizen Soldier concept in the
United States predates the U.S. Constitution. Today,
those serving in the oldest form of service to our
Nation are called upon to address one of the newest
manifestations of warfare in the realm of military
cyberspace operations. What capabilities can Reserve
component forces bring to Department of Defense
(DoD) cyberspace forces? What opportunities and
challenges surround the integration of these forces
into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force? What are
the expectations for cyber forces that serve in a militia
capacity?
This monograph explores these questions in four
major sections. The first section provides a concise
review of basic information on the laws and policies
governing the use of Reserve component forces. The
second section explores the uses of Reserve component cyber forces from a DoD perspective, focusing
on the current strength and organization of Army
National Guard (ARNG) and Reserve cyber forces and
their use as part of the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF). It
also addresses responsibilities for defense support to
civil authorities and related operational issues, training and exercise opportunities, and total force challenges. The third section examines the use of ARNG
cyber forces from the perspective of a state government, emphasizing the expectations of governors for
state incident response and cybersecurity support.
This section also addresses military-private partnerships, state-sponsored cyber ranges and exercises,
and international partnerships. In the final section, the
author offers recommendations to policymakers and
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leaders toward improving the integration and utilization of Army Reserve component cyberspace forces.
This monograph was written to serve as a primer
for senior policymakers, decision-makers, and military leaders at the federal and state levels on the
current status of the integration of Army Reserve component forces into U.S. military cyberspace operations.
The contents herein are limited to the presentation of
unclassified and open source information, therefore
any classified discussion must occur at another venue.
RESERVE COMPONENT BASICS
On any given day, the total force of Active Duty,
Reserve, and National Guard members perform cyberspace operations in locations throughout the world.
This section provides a brief description of the Army
Reserve components as a foundation for the examination of their role in the broad range of military cyberspace activities. Military Reserve components are
governed by Title 10 and Title 32, United States Code,
which defines their purpose as:
The purpose of the reserve components is to provide
trained units and qualified persons available for active
duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national
emergency and at such other times as the national security
requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever,
during, and after the period needed to procure and train
additional units and qualified persons to achieve the
planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed
than are in the regular components.1

The Army Reserve component consists of the
ARNG and Army Reserve (USAR). The ARNG is a
force of about 343,000 Soldiers, with units in 50 states, 3
territories, and the District of Columbia. ARNG members provide almost 39 percent of Army operational
2

forces.2 The USAR has an authorized strength of
199,000 Soldiers and 11,000 civilians, with units in 50
states, 5 territories, and 30 countries.3
State Active
Duty

Title 32, U.S.
Code

Title 10, U.S.
Code

Command &
Control

State Governor

State Governor

President

Who Performs
Duty

The Militia

The Federallyrecognized militia (i.e. National
Guard)

Active Component, Reserve
Component, and
National Guard

Where Duty is
Performed

Continental
United States in
accordance with
State Law

Continental
United States

Worldwide

Pay Source

In Accordance
with State Law

Federal Pay &
Allowances

Federal Pay &
Allowances

Table 1. Different Status Possibilities for National
Guard Members4
Depending on the situation, ARNG forces may
operate in any of three different statuses (as summarized in table 1): state Active Duty, full-time National
Guard (Title 32), and Active Duty (Title 10). Governors can activate ARNG to state Active Duty status in
response to emergencies based on state law and policy.
In state Active Duty status, the limitations of the Posse
Comitatus Act do not apply, and thus Guardsmen
may act in a law enforcement capacity. Governors can
also activate ARNG forces to Title 32 status with the
approval of the President or the Secretary of Defense
to conduct various Homeland Defense activities. Title
32 forces may still act in a law enforcement capacity if their chain of command remains in the state.
The President may activate ARNG forces to Title 10
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status for a variety of purposes, but the restriction of
posse comitatus applies, and they cannot perform law
enforcement duties unless specifically authorized by
the President in response to insurrection.5 In certain
complex situations, the President and Governor may
agree to establish a dual-status commander to lead a
force composed of personnel under different activation statuses.6
DOD RESERVE COMPONENT CYBERSPACE
APPLICATIONS
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy considers the Reserve
component as an integral part of DoD military cyber
operations, noting that it:
offers a unique capability for supporting each of DoD’s
missions, including for engaging the defense industrial
base and the commercial sector. It represents DoD’s
critical surge capacity for cyber responders.7

One of the strategy’s objectives focuses on improving how Reserve component cyber forces can support
broader national security needs: “Define and refine
the National Guard’s role in supporting law enforcement, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of
Civil Authorities missions.”8 This section examines
the progress that ARNG and USAR cyber forces are
making toward meeting the needs of DoD cyber
operations.
Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Responsibilities
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is the
primary organization for planning and conducting
DoD military cyberspace operations.9 These operations are conducted by the CMF, a group of over 5,000
4

individuals in 133 teams that collectively reached
their initial operating capability in October 2016. The
CMF is projected to grow to almost 6,200 personnel
when it reaches full operational capability in 2018.
There are five different types of operational units in
the CMF: National Mission Team, National Support
Team, Combat Mission Team, Combat Support Team,
and Cyber Protection Teams (CPT).10 In his May 2017
Senate testimony, Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander, USCYBERCOM, tied the contribution of
Reserve components to the CMF:
We [USCYBERCOM] will posture the CMF to deliver
effects across all phases of operations; to improve
operational outcomes by increasing resilience, speed,
agility, and precision; to generate operational outcomes
that support DoD strategy and priorities; to create a model
for successful Reserve and National Guard integration
in cyberspace operations; and finally to strengthen
partnerships across the government, with our allies, and
with the private sector.11

Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) is the Army
service component command for cyberspace operations. As such, ARCYBER is responsible for providing 41 teams for the CMF: 4 National Mission Teams,
3 National Support Teams, 8 Combat Mission Teams,
6 Combat Support Teams, and 20 CPTs. Additionally,
ARCYBER is designated as the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ)-Cyber to support U.S. Central Command,
U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Northern Command.12
Army Reserve components also have obligations to
support the USCYBERCOM CMF, which we will now
examine.
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National Guard CMF Contributions
In a memorandum of agreement signed on June 5,
2014, by Lieutenant General Edward C. Cardon, commanding general, ARCYBER and Second Army, and
Major General Judd H. Lyons, acting director, Army
National Guard, the ARNG committed to fielding 11
CPTs by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 to enhance
Army cyber enabling capabilities. Further, the agreement stipulated that “the ARNG will provide one
cyber protection team, or CPT, in an active duty,
Title 10 status, in support of ARCYBER and Second
Army.”13 Even before the memorandum of agreement
signing, the first ARNG CPT had already formed in
October 2013 at Fort Meade, MD, and was designated
the 1636th CPT as an homage to the National Guard’s
year of origin. On October 7, 2014, Cardon presided
over the ceremony that fulfilled the memorandum of
agreement provision, stating, “Today this cyber protection team represents another first―the first Army
National Guard/active duty cyber protection team.”14
The other 10 ARNG CPTs are planned to be
formed by the states shown in table 2. Each CPT is
designed to have 39 members organized into 5 squads
with a headquarters element. The Mission Protection
squad (Blue Team) provides cyber risk mitigation and
response from a perspective inside the network looking outward. The Discovery and Counter-Cyber Infiltration squad (Hunt Team) seeks out and eliminates
threat activity on friendly networks. The Cyber Threat
Emulation squad (Red Team) adopts the perspective
outside the network and emulates potential threats
to help identify vulnerabilities in cyber defenses. The
Inspection Forces/Cyber Readiness squad (White
Team) evaluates the CPT for DoD compliance and
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operational readiness and effectiveness. Finally, the
Cyber Support squad (Green Team) provides the necessary technical assistance to facilitate CPT operations
and mitigate gaps in training.15 A typical headquarters
element has the CPT chief (usually a major), an operations officer (usually a Department of Army civilian),
and a cyber warfare planner (usually a chief warrant
officer).16
Year

FY
2016

FY
2017

FY
2018

States

Team
Number

Georgia

CPT 170

California

CPT 171

Michigan/Indiana/Ohio

CPT 172

New York/New Jersey

CPT 173

Colorado/North Dakota/South Dakota/Utah

CPT 174

Alabama/Kentucky/Tennessee

CPT 175

Illinois/Wisconsin

CPT 176

Minnesota

CPT 177

Texas/Louisiana/Mississippi

CPT 178

Nebraska/Missouri/Arkansas

CPT 179

Note: A typical CPT consists of 39 members: 7 officers; 16 warrant
officers; and 16 enlisted personnel.

Table 2. Army National Guard Cyber
Protection Teams17
The ARNG national training center has stepped
up to support some of the training and certification
requirements for ARNG cyber teams. Located at Camp
Robinson, AR, the Lavern E. Weber Professional Education Center (PEC) includes the Information Technology Training Center (ITTC), which has courses that
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cover topic areas such as network engineering, server
administration, network security, and database administration, and also operates the ARNG Cyber Operations Range.18 In July 2015, the PEC worked with the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Cyber
Center of Excellence (CoE) at Fort Gordon, GA, to
deliver a pilot Cyber Common Technical Core (CCTC)
course at the Camp Robinson campus. The initial class
of this CCTC course at the PEC included members of
the 1636th CPT and Army Reserve as well as Active
Duty Army and Navy personnel. The goal is to refine
and validate the CCTC to the point where the PEC is
certified by USCYBERCOM and U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command to serve as a satellite campus
of the Cyber CoE.19
ARNG cyber forces also provide critical support to
joint operations. In August 2017, ARCYBER activated
Task Force Echo at Fort Meade, MD. Comprised of
138 ARNG members from 7 states, this new unit was
the largest mobilization of Reserve component cyber
forces to date in support of USCYBERCOM operations.20 One month later marked the activation of the
91st Cyber Brigade as part of the Virginia National
Guard. This first ARNG cyber brigade includes two
cyber battalions in Virginia and it also serves as higher
headquarters for cyber battalions in South Carolina and Massachusetts. Also, the 91st Cyber Brigade
has responsibility for training and validating the 10
National Guard CPTs.21
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Army Reserve CMF Contributions
In his March 2016 Senate testimony, Lieutenant
General Jeffrey W. Talley, Commanding General, U.S.
Army Reserve Command, summed up the posture of
cyber forces in his command as follows:
Today, the Army Reserve is committed to building 10
cyber protection teams, an Army Reserve Cyber Training
Element with advanced research and opposing force
teams, and to providing highly skilled cyber warriors to
the 1st Information Operations Command, the Defense
Information Systems Agency, and the United States
Army Cyber Command headquarters―a commitment of
more than 800 Citizen Soldiers in support of cyberspace
operations. This force structure effort is budget neutral,
which benefits both the Army and the Nation.22

At the center of the USAR cyber force is the Army
Reserve Cyber Operations Group (ARCOG) assigned
under the 335th Signal Command (Theater). The
ARCOG was established at Adelphi, MD, in October
2016 as a cyber brigade with the following mission:
The ARCOG provides trained and ready Cyber forces
under the Cyber Protection Team construct to conduct
Defensive Cyberspace Operations and Cyber support
to Army, CCMD, DoD, DSCA [Defense Support of Civil
Authorities], and other government agencies against an
evolving threat.23

The ARCOG replaced the former Army Reserve
Information Operations Command (ARIOC), which
had been organized into five information operations
centers (IOCs). Each IOC included “an operations section, a computer emergency response team (CERT)
support group, a technical research team, and an
information infrastructure defense assistance team”

9

trained using programs developed by the Software
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University.24
Currently, the ARCOG is an organization that
includes 469 Soldiers and is responsible for 10 CPTs
assigned to 1 to 5 Cyber Protections Centers (CPCs)
as depicted in table 3.25 ARCOG support activities
are not limited to the continental United States. For
example, in August 2017, a team from the Western
CPC deployed to Asia in support of Ulchi Freedom
Guardian:
an annual computer simulated defensive exercise
conducted with the Republic of Korea and the United
States Combined Forces Command, designed to enhance
readiness, protect the region and maintain stability on the
Korean peninsula.26

The integration of USAR cyber support extends to current operations of organizations such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit
(Experimental), and the Army Research Laboratory.27
Training is a critical portion of operating the USAR
cyber teams, and significant progress has been made
to integrate USAR members into mainstream Army
cyber training. In May 2017, five members of National
Capital Region CPC graduated from the CCTC course
taught by the first-ever Mobile Training Team of the
Army Cyber CoE.28 In July 2017, the first five Army
Reserve members graduated from the Cyber Operations Officer Course at the Cyber CoE, Fort Gordon,
GA.29

10

Cyber Protection
Center Region

Location

North East

Fort Devens, MA

National Capitol
Region

Adelphi, MD

South West

San Antonio, TX

North Central

Coraopolis, PA

Western

Camp Parks, CA

Team Number
CPT 180
CPT 181
CPT 182
CPT 183
CPT 184
CPT 185
CPT 186
CPT 187
CPT 188
CPT 189

Note: A typical CPT consists of 39 members: 7 officers; 16 warrant
officers; and, 16 enlisted personnel. The first two CPTs are projected
to reach initial operating capability in FY 2018.

Table 3. Army Reserve Planned Cyber
Protection Teams30
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Army Reserve components may be called upon
to support emergencies and disasters that are coordinated at the state or national level, sometimes as
part of a broader DoD support effort. Such activities
are myriad and they fall into the category of Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).31 This section
examines the continuing evolution of potential DSCA
support to cyberspace-related incidents. Foundational
guidance provided in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual (CJCSM) 6510.01B (July 10, 2012), Cyber
Incident Handling Program, assigns USCYBERCOM
the responsibility for cyber incident response efforts,
which includes coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies.
11

Further, CJCSM 6510.01B explicitly addresses such
coordination for any situation that involves DSCA.32
Cyber incidents that require a national response
are only part of a larger portfolio of incidents that
are entrusted to the DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and administered using the
National Response Framework (NRF). Simply put, the
NRF provides guidance and structure to determine
who does what in the face of national disasters and
emergencies. It provides operational concepts focused
on the priorities “to save lives, protect property and
the environment, stabilize the incident, and provide
for basic human needs.”33 The NRF identifies several
principles for successful national response operations:
“engaged partnership; tiered response; scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities; unity of
effort through unified command; and readiness to
act.”34
Army and DoD doctrine largely defer to the NRF
for DSCA related to cyberspace incidents. The DoD’s
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of
Civil Authorities addresses potential cyberspace-related
threats, but provides no actionable details regarding
DSCA-related response.35 Joint Publication (JP) 3-28,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, only addresses
cyberspace support related to securing critical information and telecommunication systems; it defers to
JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations, additional information.36 In turn, JP 3-12(R) merely points to DHS and
the NRF with regard to cyberspace-related DSCA; it
provides no amplifying information for joint forces.37
Army doctrine follows this trend in Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, with cyberspace activities mentioned
only in the context of possible threats and in regard

12

to communications support.38 Army Field Manual
(FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations,
does not address DSCA activities.39 Given the dearth
of detailed information in DoD regarding cyber incident related DSCA, let us examine what the NRF and
related documents expect from DoD.
The evolution of national response guidance
for cyber incidents, including the relevant DSCA
responsibilities, is far from complete. In May 2013,
DHS released the second edition of the NRF which
included a separate cyber incident annex.40 Oddly, the
only NRF Cyber Incident Annex provided on the FEMA
website is dated December 2004, despite being listed
as updated in March 2012.41 This version of the annex
was written before the establishment of USCYBERCOM, and thus it still refers to the defunct Joint Task
Force-Global Network Operations as the coordinator
for DoD actions.42
In July 2016, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), United States
Cyber Incident Coordination, to provide executive guidance for handling whole-of-government cyber incident response.43 Only a month before, DHS released
the NRF third edition that incorporated many of the
tenets of PPD-41, but this new edition removed the
response-related annexes (including the Cyber Incident Annex), stating that they were moved to the
DHS Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan
(FIOP).44 However, the FIOP second edition, released
in August 2016, does not have any reference to such a
cyber incident annex.45 In fact, the only DHS Response
FIOP annex listed on the FEMA website is one for
nuclear/radiological incidents.46

13

Regardless of this disconnect, DHS released the
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) in
December 2016, which was developed to implement
the requirements of PPD-41.47 Despite the significant
progress made in 2016 following PPD-41, details of
national response to cyber incidents remain somewhat
convoluted and should be studied in greater detail
than the scope of this monograph allows. For now, let
us explore how cyberspace-related DSCA is portrayed
in the current NCIRP.
The stated NCIRP scope reflects a whole-of-nation approach to cyber incidents, describing itself
as “the strategic framework for operational coordination among federal and SLTT [state, local, tribal,
and territorial] governments, the private sector, and
international partners.”48 The document is built upon
five guiding principles derived from PPD-41: shared
responsibility, risk-based response, respecting affected
entities, unity of government effort, and enabling restoration and recovery.49 To enable a common operational context, the NCIRP uses the PPD-41 definitions
for “cyber incident” and “significant cyber incident”
and provides a methodology for differentiating the
two.50 Also, the NCIRP implements the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) concept from PPD-41
to provide an appropriate and consistent forum for
national-level cyber incident coordination.51 National
policy and strategy coordination is charged to the
DHS-led Cyber Response Group (CRG).52 Depending
on the circumstances, DoD may be a participant in
both CRG and Cyber UCG.
How do DoD and Army Reserve components support the cyber DSCA efforts of the NCIRP? There are
at least six different areas where such support may
occur (which are summarized in table 4). First, the
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NCIRP acknowledges DoD’s responsibility for protecting its own cyberspace network assets as well as
its ability to support civil authorities as authorized by
law or directed by the President.53 It also recognizes
the various roles that National Guard cyber forces
may perform to support cybersecurity activities at the
state or federal level (to include DSCA), depending on
their duty status.54 Second, myriad Army Active and
Reserve component units provide intelligence support
through routine threat and situational awareness operations and may provide technical assistance as part of
DSCA activities.55 Third, DoD and Army total force
cyber units operate three of the seven federal cybersecurity centers identified in the NCIRP “to execute
operational missions, enhance information sharing,
maintain situational awareness of cyber incidents, and
serve as conduits between public- and private-sector
stakeholder entities.”56 Fourth, national cyber incident
response efforts can leverage the existing liaison relationship between contacts in the 10 FEMA regions and
Army Active, Reserve, and National Guard units.57
Fifth, DoD and Army cyberspace forces may provide
support as determined by a Cyber UCG to the DHS
for asset response efforts, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for threat response efforts, and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for intelligence support efforts.58 Finally, a sixth area of DoD
and Army total force support to national cyber incident response is the general support of 14 core capabilities—such as cybersecurity, forensics, planning,
and situational awareness—identified in the NCIRP
as “activities that generally must be accomplished in
cyber incident response, regardless of which levels of
government are involved.”59
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Area of National Cyber Incident Support

Circumstances

Network protection

Ongoing operations
and DSCA

Intelligence support

Ongoing operations
and DSCA

Cybersecurity center operation:
•

USCYBERCOM Joint Operations Center
(JOC)

•

NSA Cybersecurity Threat Operations
Center (NCTOC)

•

DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
Liaison with FEMA regions

Ongoing operations
and DSCA

Ongoing operations
and DSCA

Cyber UCG support:
•

DHS (asset response lead agency)

•

DOJ (threat response lead agency)

•

ODNI (intelligence support lead agency)
NCIRP core capability support

DSCA

DSCA

Note: DSCA efforts are requested by civil authorities and authorized
by law or directed by the President.

Table 4. Areas of DoD Support to National
Cyber Incidents
A significant challenge for effective cyber incident response is the diversity of state, local, tribal,
and territorial government organizations that coordinate FEMA, DoD, and National Guard activities. The
NCIRP notes, “While many state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments are developing and utilizing
operational coordination structures for cyber incident response, they have not all adopted a standard
approach.”60 What other challenges are present in
cyber DSCA operations?
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Operational Issues
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
published three studies in the last 2 years that address
issues on how to fully and properly implement DoD
cyber forces—especially Reserve components—into
DSCA actions related to cyber incidents. The June 2015
GAO report “DOD Is Taking Action to Strengthen
Support of Civil Authorities,” noted that DoD had not
implemented a 2012 GAO recommendation to update
DoD DSCA guidance “to ensure that it was consistent
with national plans and preparations for domestic
cyber incidents.”61 Based on the preceding discussion
in this monograph, the GAO finding remains valid.
The April 2016 GAO report, “DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support
of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents,” built
upon the 2015 GAO report and concluded that, while
DoD had improved its DSCA guidance in many areas,
the support for cyber incident response remained
insufficient:
Whether DOD updates DSCA guidance or issues
additional guidance on a separate cyber-technical
assistance framework, without clarifying guidance on
DOD roles and responsibilities in a cyber incident, DOD
cannot reasonably ensure that the department will be
able to most effectively employ its capabilities to support
civil authorities in a cyber incident.62

To support this conclusion, the report had three
key findings that identify significant operational gaps
and seams with regard to how DoD supports civil
authorities during or after a cyber incident. First, the
existing DoD guidance for DSCA does not explicitly
address roles and responsibilities for cyber forces.
Second, for cyber incidents in the continental United
17

States, it is unclear whether the supported command
with primary responsibility for cyber DSCA is U.S.
Northern Command or USCYBERCOM. Interestingly,
the study noted that U.S. Northern Command had yet
to receive a cyber DSCA request from DoD. Third,
current DSCA guidance does not address the role of a
dual-status commander for cyber DSCA.63 The report
noted that ARNG forces normally respond to emergencies in state status.64
Independent Cyber Mission Analysis reports to
Congress in 2014 by DoD and the National Guard
Bureau (NGB) acknowledge the need for clarity in the
organization and command structures noted by the
GAO. With respect to total force opportunities, both
reports found that “cyber reserve components can
offer load sharing and surge capacity and [NGB] supports DOD’s plan to integrate reserve personnel into
cyberspace forces.”65
The September 2016 GAO report, “DOD Needs
to Identify National Guard’s Cyber Capabilities and
Address Challenges in Its Exercises,” examined three
areas of cyber capabilities found in ARNG units: communications directorates, computer network defense
teams, and cyber operations units.66 The GAO investigation included nongeneralizable interviews with
state officials of the Georgia, Nevada, and Washington National Guard. One of the key findings was that
DoD had still not acted upon earlier GAO recommendations to issue implementation guidance for the use
of dual-status commanders in cyber incidents.67 However, the most significant study finding was that DoD
does not have adequate visibility of all ARNG cyber
capabilities available for DSCA activities. Although
the NGB uses the Defense Readiness Reporting System
and Joint Information Exchanges Environment,
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“officials acknowledged that neither of these systems
fully or quickly identified National Guard cyber capabilities that could be used to support civil authorities
in a cyber incident.”68
As solutions are developed to address these operational challenges identified by the GAO, it is prudent
that they be tested in a controlled environment before
being implemented in real DSCA events. Large-scale
cyber exercises can provide valuable opportunities
to practice and refine new DSCA constructs for cyber
incidents involving Active and Reserve component
forces.
Cyber Exercises
Army Reserve component units participate in
two major annual cyber exercises. Cyber Guard is
co-hosted with USCYBERCOM at the Top Secret level
to explore interagency responses to cyberattacks on
U.S. critical infrastructure. Cyber Shield is an unclassified exercise that focuses “on the defense of Guard
Net and state-directed coordination actions.”69 The
upcoming section of this monograph on state cyberspace applications addresses further details of Cyber
Shield exercises.
Cyber Guard was first conducted in 2012 with
a goal “to foster coordinated cyberspace incident
responses between the federal and state governments, exploring the Army National Guard (ARNG)
potential as an enabler and ‘force multiplier’ in the
cyberspace domain.”70 With the intent to practice a
whole-of-nation response to cyberattacks, the exercise
has expanded each year to incorporate participants
from DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and the Federal Aviation Administration, as well as
allies, private industry partners, and academia. Cyber
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Shield also works to integrate the activities of multiple
federal and state operations centers and information
fusion centers.71 Cyber Guard 17 was held in July 2017,
with over 40 participants from 22 different countries,
and included a “Multinational Day” for the second
consecutive year.72 Of particular interest to the Army
is the Cyber Guard objective to support the development of a Persistent Cyberspace Training Environment across DoD, an effort for which the Army has
been designated as acquisition lead.73
In its 2016 report on ARNG cyber exercises, the
GAO noted three specific challenges in the way DoD
runs these exercises: limited access of some team
members because of classified exercise environments;
limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical
infrastructure owners; and inadequate incorporation
of scenarios with joint physical-cyber effects. Further,
a key finding of the report was that the DoD “needs
to conduct a tier 1 exercise to explore a disaster with
physical and cyber effects.”74
The Cyber Guard 17 preparation material included
a USCYBERCOM presentation on Cyber DSCA command and control that appeared to offer some progress
in the area of defining command relationships. The
presentation provided detailed organization wiring
diagrams for three scenarios: DSCA in a multi-domain operation; DSCA in a cyber-only operation with
ARNG forces in state Active Duty status; and DSCA
in cyber-only operations with some ARNG forces activated to Title 10 status. A prominent feature of each
diagram was a dual-status commander with clearly
defined lines of command, coordination, and support,
including a Title 10 deputy and ARNG deputy.75
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Total Force Issues
In 2014, the Reserve Forces Policy Board published
the report, Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use
of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission
Force, which advocated for the inclusion of Reserve
components into the emerging CMF structure.76 While
the current 133 CMF teams are all Active Duty units,
the report’s intent to integrate cyber Reserve components is coming to fruition. In his 2016 USAR posture
report to Congress, Talley clearly connected his command, the Army Total Force, and the CMF:
As the Army continues to develop its cyber needs, the
Army Reserve will continue to grow its cyber force
through the Total Army Analysis process. We will also
continue to collaborate with all Cyber Mission Force
[CMF] partners to develop new and innovative training
strategies, to include public and private partnerships
with academia, industry and government, to lessen the
length of time needed for training future cyber warriors
by leveraging civilian-acquired education and work
experience.77

While the tenets offered by Talley sound reasonable, it may take several years to amass enough operational data to assess properly and refine the Total
Force balance required for cyberspace operations. The
2016 book published by Air University, The Human
Side of Cyber Conflict, offers a critical analysis and some
earlier insights of this integration process that resonate
with the challenges facing Army Reserve component
cyber operations:
However, the rapid growth of RC [Reserve component]
cyber units, coupled with the recent (2010) stand-up of
USCYBERCOM, means that the roles and missions of both
the Guard and Reserve are only now being understood.
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Cost savings alone is an invalid reason to stand up more
RC cyber units. Solid requirements must drive force
presentation, and policy makers and military planners
alike must have access to accurate cost calculations. Using
the civilian expertise of RC cyber warriors is an attractive
selling point for RC cyber units, but people in civilian
cyber first-responder jobs or in damage-mitigation roles
cannot be counted on to choose between their civilian
careers and activation.78

Cyberspace Reserve Components of Other Service
Other military Service cyber component commands
are also integrating Reserve component personnel into
their force structure. The Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command is adding 298 cyber Reserve billets individually
aligned to augment the cyber defense capabilities for
their CPT and JFHQ-Cyber.79 Many operational units
within the Air Force Cyber Command are augmented
by members of the 960th Cyberspace Operations
Group that includes five squadrons that can conduct
various forms of defensive cyber operations.80
The Air National Guard is of particular interest
since these forces may be closely aligned with the
ARNG in the same state. The Air National Guard
designates its CPT-qualified units as cyber operations squadrons and the current plan is to have 12 Air
National Guard CPT-capable units that will field 2 full
time CPTs on a rotational basis (see table 5).81 The typical cyber operations squadron structure consists of
35 members organized in the same manner as ARNG
CPTs, with a leadership element that directs 5 teams:
cyber threat emulation, mission protection, defensive cyber infiltration, cyber readiness, and a cyber
support.82

22

State

Air National Guard CPT

Idaho

224th Cyber Operations Squadron

Iowa

168th Cyber Operations Squadron

Kansas

127th Cyber Operations Squadron

Maryland

275th Cyber Operations Squadron
276th Cyber Operations Squadron

Michigan

272d Cyber Operations Squadron

New Jersey

140th Cyber Operations Squadron

Pennsylvania

112th Cyber Operations Squadron

Texas

273d Cyber Operations Squadron

Virginia

185th Cyber Operations Squadron

Washington

143d Cyber Operations Squadron

California

261st Cyber Operations Squadron

Table 5. Air National Guard Cyber Protection Teams
Recruitment and Retention
Recognizing the opportunities for highly skilled
cyberspace technicians employed in the private sector
to serve their country, the USAR established the Cyber
Private Public Partnership (Cyber P3) initiative as
“a cost-effective, innovative way to integrate public
and private industry partnerships to recruit, train,
educate, develop, and retain critical cyber skills.”83
The program started in 2015 with 6 university and
12 employer partners, including companies such as
Microsoft, Verizon, and T-Mobile. The program is
designed both to recruit potential qualified Reserve
members and to help transition Active Duty Soldiers
to Reserve positions while providing continuing education and acquiring employment in the cyber-related
job market.84

23

In 2017, the RAND Corporation published Cyber
Power Potential of the Army’s Reserve Component that
examined the current cyber skills, roles, and missions that exist in the Army Reserve component as
well as assessed the recruitment, training, and assignment of cyber personnel. Their findings confirmed
the extremely competitive environment for recruiting cyber talent and found that the skills required for
many roles in the CMF could be acquired using civilian-based training. Further, the RAND team found
that experience in civilian cyber jobs was usually
frequent and relevant enough for individuals to stay
“cyber-sharp” for military applications. The study
results also indicated that the DoD and the Army need
improved insight into the inventory of their cyber personnel and noted that there exists a significant number
of personnel already in the Reserve components that
have untapped cyber skills. Finally, the study members advocated the use of a standard cyber aptitude
assessment tool for evaluating prospective recruits.85
Such an asset would be a valuable tool to support a
program under DoD consideration to establish direct
commissioning for cyber officers in a similar manner
to programs already in place for medical doctors, lawyers, and chaplains.86
In reality, it may be too soon to discuss the question
of total cyber force balance as there is not sufficient
data with regard to what actual forces are available,
what mission these forces accomplish, and what broad
requirements they should fulfill. It appears that the
great competition for cyber resources may be encouraging the Army and the DoD to create and fill billets
as fast as possible without scrutinizing the true needs
and resources already available.

24

STATE CYBERSPACE APPLICATIONS
The previous section viewed the roles of Army
Reserve component cyber units primarily through
the lens of DoD operations performed under Title 10
authorities. This section adopts the perspective of U.S.
state governments and the relevant state Active Duty
and Title 32 authorities. The scope of discussion is not
intended to be comprehensive; rather, this section provides illustrative examples of specific state implementation of Reserve component cyber competencies. Due
to the unique capabilities to operate in multiple activation statuses, the discussions herein emphasize the
role of ARNG units.
Expectations of State Governors
The National Governors Association (NGA) website includes a “Governor’s Guide to Cybersecurity”
page dedicated to the question: “Why is the National
Guard integral to state cybersecurity?”87 The ensuing discussion highlights the capabilities that ARNG
units can provide not only to address major cyber incident responses but also to “assist routine, steady-state
cybersecurity activities to defend state and local computer systems.”88 In pursuing these tasks, the ARNG
offers governors the flexibility to lever members’
experience and relationships with technology companies and academia as well as to provide access to DoD
cyberspace resources, if requested.
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Incident Response Responsibilities
The ARNG has established Defensive Cyberspace
Operations Elements in all 54 states, territories, and
the District of Columbia “to provide the first line of
defense for our military networks.”89 The elements
were formed in 1999 to address Y2K issues and, until
2017, were known as Computer Network Defense
Teams. Current Defensive Cyberspace Operations
Elements are small teams (8-10 members) organized
at the state level. In January 2013, Computer Network Defense Team members from seven states came
together for the first joint Computer Network Defense
Team operation to support cybersecurity measures
for the 57th Presidential Inauguration. The team of 27
Airmen and Soldiers provided “defense capabilities
[that] were applied to various voice, video, and data
communication systems that supported tactical operations.”90 The NGB has a goal to grow the number of
these teams to 2,800 personnel collectively by 2019.91
An October 2014 paper by the NGA Center for Best
Practices identified Delaware, Maryland, Michigan,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin as among the first
states to leverage the capabilities of these ARNG cyber
defense teams to address state cyber incidents.92 The
number of states incorporating ARNG forces in their
state processes continues to grow. The South Carolina ARNG invested $1 million in Computer Network
Defense Team training and certification to develop a
16-member team that is “ready to respond to any incident that occurs on the cyber scale . . . from a simple
phishing attempt to a large-scale cyber attack causing destruction to a physical structure.”93 In February
2016, the Florida ARNG Computer Network Defense
Team supported exercises with state agencies that
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included “mock incursions from hacktivist groups,
terrorist organizations and nation-states.”94
In February 2017, the NGA released a policy statement on cybersecurity which provides five principles
to describe its vision for how federal and state governments should work together in the response and
recovery actions following a cyberattack. One principle emphasizes the need for unity of effort with
national efforts defined in the NCIRP:
Processes should be established and tested to ensure
coordination and communications between federal and
state authorities during cyber incidents are effective and
consistent. Alignment of state cybersecurity plans with
the National Cyber Incident Response Plan will facilitate
an efficient and coordinated government response to
serious cyber incidents.95

The National Guard Cyber Threat Working Group
supports this principle as “a process to create a unified strategic message from NGB staffs to the States,
Territories and District of Columbia, to ensure the . . .
[National Guard] responds appropriately to cyber
threats.”96 This process allows the Cyber Coordination
Cell within the National Guard Coordination Center
to convene the National Guard Cyber Threat Working
Group to address cyber events.97
With the emphasis on cybersecurity and cyber
incident response promulgated by the NGA, one
might assume that ARNG cyber capabilities are
explicitly cited in official state emergency response
and recovery plans. But a survey of some of these
plans indicates otherwise. Table 6 is a summary of the
review of 15 emergency response plans taken from
the official public websites of 11 states and the District of Columbia. Only 6 of these 15 plans provided
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actionable details for responses to cyber incidents,
and only the Florida Emergency Management Plan
explicitly included specific ARNG cyber capabilities (albeit in the plan’s Terrorism annex).98 It is particularly surprising that states with a strong military
cyberspace presence—such as Maryland (USCYBERCOM and Fleet Cyber Command headquarters), Georgia (ARCYBER headquarters), Texas (Air Force Cyber
Command/24th Air Force headquarters), and Virginia
(ARCYBER headquarters elements)—have no mention of ARNG or other military cyberspace capabilities
in the state’s primary emergency response plans. Further investigation of the reasons behind these gaps in
operational planning documents is beyond the scope
of this monograph, but the implications do not bode
well for the unity of effort between federal and state
authorities to leverage military cyberspace capabilities
effectively in emergency situations.

State Plan

*Cyber Incident Details Addressed?

National Guard
Cyber Capabilities
Included?

Arizona: Arizona State
Emergency
Response
and Recovery Plan
(February 2017)

(Annex)

Yes

No

California: State of
California Emergency
Plan (October 2017)

Yes

No

Colorado:
Colorado
Hazard and Incident
Response and Recovery
Plan (November 2016)

Yes
(Appendix & Annex)

No

Table 6. Incorporation of Cyber Incident Response
in State Emergency Plans99
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*Cyber Incident Details Addressed?

National Guard
Cyber Capabilities
Included?

District of Columbia:
District Response Plan
(September 2014)

No

No

Florida: The State of
Florida 2016 Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan
(2016)

Yes

Yes

Georgia:
Georgia
Emergency Operations
Plan (January 2015)

No

No

Georgia:
Georgia
Emergency Operations
Plan 2015: Department
of Defense Annex, Defense Support (2015)

No

No

Maryland: State of
Maryland Response Operations Plan (SROP)
(March 2015)

No

No

Maryland: State of
Maryland Consequence
Management
Operations Plan (September
2017)

No

No

Michigan: Michigan
Emergency
Management Plan (July 2016)

Yes

No

Pennsylvania: Commonwealth Emergency
Operations Plan (June
2017)

No

No

Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 2013 Standard
State All-Hazard Mitigation Plan (2013)

No

No

State Plan

Table 6. Incorporation of Cyber Incident Response
in State Emergency Plans (cont.)
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*Cyber Incident Details Addressed?

National Guard
Cyber Capabilities
Included?

Texas: State Of Texas
Emergency
Management Plan (February
2015)

No

No

Virginia:
Commonwealth of Virginia
Emergency Operations
Plan (March 2015)

No

No

Washington:
Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan
(June 2016)

Yes
(Annex-March 2015)

No

State Plan

*Note: For a “Yes” in this column, the plan must have an explicit section that addresses how the state uses specific resources to address
cyber incident responses. The mere mention of “cyber” or “cybersecurity” is not sufficient.

Table 6. Incorporation of Cyber Incident Response
in State Emergency Plans (cont.)
It is interesting to note that some of the plans
that were void of ARNG cyber capability references
included significant details on ARNG chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives response
capabilities, such as civil support teams. Concepts
for cyber support teams have been proposed twice in
Congress, but not yet adopted. The Cyber Warrior Bill
of 2013 called for the development of ARNG Cyber
and Computer Network Incident Response Teams
in all states; no action beyond its initial introduction
has occurred since March 2013.100 Similar legislation
was proposed in September 2017―the Major General
Tim Lowenberg National Guard Cyber Defenders
Act―to establish Reserve component cyber civil support teams.101 A more radical piece of legislation is the
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Cyber Defense National Guard Act, a 2015 proposal
to explore the feasibility of creating a separate Cyber
Defense National Guard. It too has not progressed in
Congress since its introduction.102
Support to State Cybersecurity
The NGA Governor’s Guide to Cybersecurity
advocates four areas of ARNG cyber support to help
improve the defense of state and local computer systems: risk assessment, network design, training, and
cyber response exercises.103 In fact, there are examples of such ongoing ARNG cyber support in each of
these areas. In Michigan, the ARNG is part of a “red
team” that can conduct penetration testing on state
networks to expose cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
With this information, the team can help improve
network design and “inform the allocation of additional resources and mitigation measures.”104 Similar
ARNG support provided risk assessments and network design improvement efforts to South Carolina’s
state tax agency as well as California’s and Maryland’s state agency networks.105 To provide training to
key state officials, the Missouri ARNG cyber defense
team initiated “table-top exercises with the state government and the owners of critical infrastructure.”106
Also, Washington includes ARNG cyber personnel as
part of its Joint Forces Defense Assessment Team that
conducts risk assessment and cyber emergency planning.107 In November 2016, cyber defense teams in the
Ohio and Maryland ARNG were called upon to help
protect state computer systems that supported elections, such as voter registration databases.108
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State Initiatives and Opportunities
Another question asked in the NGA Governor’s
Guide to Cybersecurity is: “What Can Governors do
to Enhance the National Guard’s Role in Cybersecurity?” The proffered answer covers four general areas:
map National Guard cyber unit capabilities; determine
how ARNG cyber units can be used in nonemergency
scenarios; push for clarifications in DoD guidance in
cyber DSCA; and, identify dual-purpose ARNG cyber
training exercises that achieve federal objectives while
fulfilling state cybersecurity objectives.109 The preceding sections discussed how ARNG cyber units can be
utilized in cyber response actions and nonemergency
state support. This section will explore how private
sector partnerships, cyber ranges, and cyber exercises
may enhance both ARNG cyber unit effectiveness and
state cybersecurity.
Military-Private Sector Partnerships
The USAR Cyber Private Public Partnership initiative has five lines of effort that facilitate mutually
beneficial partnerships not only with employers and
universities as discussed earlier, but also with community outreach, research and training infrastructure, and strategic communication.110 The initial six
Cyber Private Public Partnership partner universities
were dispersed across the Nation: Drexel University
(Pennsylvania); University of Washington (Washing
ton); George Mason University (Virginia); the University of Texas at San Antonio (Texas); Norwich
University (Vermont); and, the University of Colorado
(Colorado).111
But partnerships with state universities are not limited to the Cyber Private Public Partnership program.
For example, the Georgia ARNG teamed with the
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Georgia Tech Research Institute during Cyber Shield
2017. During the exercise, Georgia Tech Research Institute provided support in the areas of network infrastructure, information technology administration, and
malware analysis. The official Georgia Tech Research
Institute article summarizing these efforts noted:
“This inaugural collaborative cyber effort between
Georgia Tech Research Institute and the Guard will,
it is hoped, lead to a long-term, strategic relationship,
supporting various state of Georgia and DoD activities.”112 Another partnership example is the Louisiana
ARNG work with the Louisiana State University Stephenson Disaster Management Institute during the
Vigilant Guard 2016 exercise. Facilities at the institute
allowed the ARNG team to simulate a series of cyberattacks and “to train alongside other government
entities such as the FBI, the Department of Homeland
Security and the Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion
Exchange.”113
In the future, ARNG cyber units may have the
opportunity to deal with unique state organizations
with complementary cyber capabilities like those of
the Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps, a group of volunteer cybersecurity experts with stringent membership
requirements. The Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps
mission is “to work with government, education, private sector organizations, and volunteers to create and
implement a rapid response team to be activated under
a Governor declared Cyber State of Emergency.”114
Cyber Ranges
As a key part of its cyber training program, the
PEC ITTC also hosts and operates the ARNG Cyber
Operations Range.115 In addition to this ARNG facility,
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several states are developing cyber ranges with capabilities that ARNG cyber units could leverage for training and certification. Table 7 provides some examples
of state-sponsored cyber ranges that could accommodate ARNG training as well as provide a collaborative
environment for addressing state cybersecurity challenges among government, military, academic, and
private sector participants. Other states have programs
underway that include the development of cyber
ranges with ARNG supporters. In February 2017, the
Ohio Adjutant General’s Department announced the
establishment of the Ohio Cyber Collaboration Committee, a group of more than 30 government, military, academic, and private sector organizations. The
Ohio Cyber Collaboration Committee was formed at
the request of Governor John Kasich, and one of its
goals is “to create a cyber range—a virtual environment used for cybersecurity training and technology
development.”116 In January 2017, Georgia Governor
Nathan Deal announced plans to establish the Georgia Cyber Innovation and Training Center in Augusta.
This $50 million state-funded initiative will include
a state-owned cyber range used “to establish cybersecurity standards across state and local agencies to
develop and practice protocols for responding to cyber
threats.”117 The proposed cyber range will be designed
with military users like the Georgia ARNG and
ARCYBER in mind, and it will have the unique feature
among state cyber ranges of being able to operate as a
sensitive compartmented information facility.118 These
ranges are still on the drawing board, so let us look at
the Michigan Cyber Range as an established example
of what a cyber range can provide.
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State

Cyber Range Description

Florida

The Florida Cyber Range provides advanced training
and testing solutions for academic, government, military
and industry organizations through cybersecurity exercises, competitions, conferences, operations and research.
The Florida Cyber Range will support education, training and research for emerging needs, including ethical
hacking and penetration testing, computer and network
security, critical infrastructure and industrial control
systems security, Internet of Things security, defensive
cyberspace operations and cyber war gaming.119

Maryland

Baltimore Cyber Range (opened August 2017). Leveraging the Cyberbit Range platform, the BCR facility allows
cybersecurity practitioners the opportunity to experience the latest real-world cyber threats in a controlled
and sequestered environment to improve their hands-on
skills. The range, which can simulate large-scale virtual
networks and attacks based on real-world incidents,
can also pinpoint system vulnerabilities and help users
develop countermeasures and improved protocols for
dealing with cyber-attacks on critical network systems.
As a result, cybersecurity practitioners benefit from
receiving real-time training for threat detection, and the
response process, enabling them to dramatically improve
the performance of all security and SOC [security operations center] teams.120

Michigan

Established in 2012, the Michigan Cyber Range has
trained more than 2,900 whole community partners
through interactive, virtual training programs. Initially
supported with $365,000 in Homeland Security Grant
Program. (HSGP) funds, the Cyber Range is a public-private partnership offering in-person and online courses in
14 topics including digital forensics, incident handling,
penetration testing, and information systems auditing.121

Virginia

Regent University Cyber Range training center. The
Cyber Range will also serve as a training center for local
businesses, government and military organizations, and
features customizable capabilities to meet every industry’s data protection needs.
The world-class facility will provide hands-on cybersecurity training and simulation platforms with real-time
attack scenarios and security breaches for Regent students seeking to fill the projected 6 million job openings
in the cybersecurity field by 2019.122

Table 7. Examples of State-Sponsored Cyber Ranges
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The Michigan Cyber Range was opened by Governor Rick Snyder in November 2012 as an initiative
to pair “cybersecurity resources with hands-on training opportunities to enhance Michigan’s protection
of computer systems and sensitive data.”123 Initially
hosted at Eastern Michigan University, the applications and audiences envisioned for the cyber range
included infrastructure defense, homeland security,
law enforcement, education, and private sector business.124 Since then, the Michigan Cyber Range has
grown by adding hubs at different university locations
throughout the state, all connected by over 4,000 miles
of fiber-optic cable. The range also added “Alphaville,”
a virtual city with a typical urban information city that
can be used in cyber defense exercises.125 In 2014, the
fourth hub of the Michigan Cyber Range was opened
at the 110th Airlift Wing on the Kellogg Air National
Guard Base in Battle Creek. Since then, members of
the Michigan Army and Air National Guard have utilized the Alphaville model for training as well as collaboration with organizations such as West Point and
the California ARNG.126
Cyber Exercises
As mentioned earlier, Cyber Shield is an unclassified annual exercise that concentrates on defense
of ARNG networks. Like the Cyber Guard series,
Cyber Shield exercises have grown steadily each year
in many areas, such as the number of participants,
number of states and territories represented, and complexity of the scenario. “Cyber Shield prepares the
citizen-soldiers to Defend the Network, but also participate in the planning and execution of national-level
exercises such as Cyber Guard and Cyber Flag which
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focus on the broader mission of Defend the Nation.”127
There are significant implications for this exercise that
work to improve how the ARNG protects its networks:
Each week the National Guard’s 54 Cyber Network
Defense Teams (CNDT) defend the Guard’s cyber
backbone, GUARDNet, from more than 100,000 cyber
attacks. GUARDNet connects 3,000 armories in 11
different time zones across the continental U.S. along
with Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam and
Puerto Rico. It provides a critical link for command and
control of the National Guard and continuity of services
in times of emergency.128

With the enactment of Cyber Shield 15, the exercise
focus started to emphasize DSCA aspects that were
facilitated with the Cyber City training tool developed
by the SANS Institute, North Bethesda, MD, as “a
real city with working infrastructure and power grids
allowing for visual result of what the CND teams
might be facing as a future mission in their state.”129
During Cyber Shield 16, the DSCA elements of the
exercise were further refined with the addition of participants from industries such as water and electrical
utility companies.130
Cyber Shield 2017 started in April 2017 with its
purpose “to provide a collective training event to
evaluate cyber operations and set the conditions for
team validation.”131 The 2-week exercise was held in
Camp W. G. Williams, UT, with the 75th Training
Command (USAR) providing the exercise operations
such as C2 and training analyses and assessments
cells. ARNG and USAR from 44 states and territories
worked together during Cyber Shield 2017 in an exercise environment that facilitated the ability “to share
and collaborate in regards to tactics, techniques and
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procedures” as well as “to test their skills in response
to cyber-incidents in a multi-service environment.”132
Other collaborative cyber training activities
include Cyber Yankee, an annual exercise initiated
in 2015 to bring Army and Air National Guard cyber
defense and intelligence units together from the six
New England states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
The initial exercise was developed with support from
DHS, FEMA, the FBI, the MITRE Corporation, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratories.133 In 2017, Cyber Yankee included participation from government partners at the local, state, and
federal level that engaged in “mock drills defending
websites, databases, and computer programs against
simulated cyber-attacks from hackers, criminal elements, and international non-state actors.”134 Also,
the ARCOG and Carnegie Mellon University hosted
the Cyber-X games in June 2017, a 5-day exercise
involving almost 50 participants from Pennsylvania
Army and Air National Guard units, Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.135 The
Cyber-X games provided advanced cybersecurity
training and served as a prelude to the Cyber Endeavour conference held the following week at Carnegie
Mellon University.
International Partnerships
The ARNG State Partnership Program (SPP) is
a well-established vehicle initiated at the end of the
Cold War “to build enduring mil-to-mil and civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity.”136
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Currently, there are 73 partnerships across all U.S.
geographic combatant commands. During 2016, there
were over 750 SPP events, including several related
to cyberspace capability development.137 Table 8 provides examples of cyber-related SPP events that have
occurred within different combatant commands over
the past 3 years.
State

SPP Partner
Nation

Event

California

Ukraine

Colorado

Jordan

Hawaii

Indonesia

Maryland

Estonia

Baltic Ghost exercise
Baltic Ghost exercise

SMEE on cyber defense practices
SMEE on network defense and cyber
intelligence
SMEE on cyber defense practices

Michigan

Latvia

Nebraska

Czech
Republic

NATO cyber defense information
sharing

New Hampshire

El Salvador

SMEE on cyber operation interoperability

New Jersey

Albania

SMEE on NATO cybersecurity interoperability

North Carolina

Moldova

SMEE on cyber defense practices

North Dakota

Ghana

Assessment of cybersecurity programs

Ohio

Serbia

Cyber Tesla 2017

Pennsylvania

Lithuania

Baltic Ghost exercise

Washington

Thailand

SMEE on improving cyber defenses

Note: SMEE = Subject Matter Expertise Exchange

Table 8. Examples of Cyber-Related SPP Events138
With the increased concern for Russian military
cyberspace activity, the SPP programs with the Baltic
nations have grown in prominence. Baltic Ghost
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started as a series of cyber defense workshops facilitated by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to
build and sustain cyber partnerships amongst Estonia
and the Maryland ARNG, Latvia and the Michigan
ARNG, and Lithuania and the Pennsylvania ARNG.139
Baltic Ghost transitioned to become a training exercise in September 2015―held simultaneously in the
capitals of Tallinn (Estonia), Riga (Latvia), and Vilnius (Lithuania)―and focused on the coordination of
responses to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.140
The exercise was most recently hosted by USEUCOM
in June 2017, with participation by the ARNG state
partners and assistance by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence. Baltic Ghost 2017 pursued an objective “to
test cooperation between the three Baltic States and
the United States in the event of an escalating cyber
incident, the solution of which requires internationally coordinated joint action.”141 In August 2017, the
Maryland ARNG also supported Estonia in the Baltic
Jungle cyber exercise, which included opportunities
to exchange experiences in the areas of cyber range
development, education, and research.142 In September
2017, members of the Ohio and Serbian armed forces
worked together in the second annual Cyber Tesla
exercise, which examined cyber incident preparation
and responses processes.143
The ARNG also supports the education and training of partner nations at U.S. facilities. In July 2015, the
ARNG PEC welcomed the first group on international
military students for a 6-week integrated information
technology training course. Four students from Bulgaria, Poland, and the Slovak Republic attended, with
two Illinois Guardsmen training in the same class with
their Polish state partner.144
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RECOMMENDATIONS
This monograph provides a brief overview of how
Army Reserve component cyber capabilities are being
integrated into a variety of DoD and state operations.
Steady and significant progress in this process has
been made since the establishment of the USCYBERCOM and the CMF. This section offers recommendations to help identify and resolve issues that challenge
the utility and effectiveness of future ARNG and
USAR operations.
Recommendation 1
The Army and DoD need to establish and maintain
a database of Reserve component cyberspace capabilities that is readily available for state or federal emergency responses.
This recommendation was also raised in a 2016
report―GAO-16-574―that calls for the Secretary of
Defense to maintain such a database “to ensure that
decision-makers have immediate visibility into all
capabilities of the National Guard that could support
civil authorities in a cyber incident.”145 However, for
the Army, this must be a team effort that includes the
Army G-3/5/7, the state adjutant generals, and chiefs
of the NGB and USAR. While establishing the initial
database is not trivial, it is probably the easiest part of
the task. The real challenge will be to establish procedures for the regular review, update, and distribution
of changes as well as methods for ensuring changes are
incorporated into the myriad plans at the state, local,
tribal, territorial, interagency, and federal levels. Once
established, annual exercises such as Cyber Guard
and Cyber Shield could offer opportunities to improve
the accuracy of the database, especially if review of the
database was included as an exercise objective.
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Recommendation 2
DoD should work with DHS to clarify the currency
and applicability of a cyber incident response annex to
the NRF.
The current version of the NRF (3d Edition, June
2016) notifies readers that all response annexes
(including the cyber incident annex) that appeared in
the early version of the NRF have been moved to the
FIOP. However, the current version of the FIOP (2d
Edition, August 2016) does not include these annexes;
in fact, it actually refers the matter of cyber incident
response back to the NRF by stating, “For cyber incidents that have significant physical cascading effects,
FEMA leads the physical consequence management
effort in accordance with the National Response
Framework.”146 Adding to the confusion of this
vicious reference cycle, the current NCIRP (December
2016) states that the Secretary of DHS “shall regularly
update, maintain, and exercise the Cyber Incident
Annex to the NRF of the Department,” another reference to an annex that no longer exists there.147 Regardless of this procedural disconnect, the most current
DHS Cyber Incident Annex available online is dated
December 2004, and it could not incorporate the provisions of PPD-41. Finally, to help clarify operations
between DHS and DoD, Army and joint doctrine
should explicitly address DSCA for cyber incidents―
at the very least pointing to key documents such as the
NCIRP, even if they are currently flawed in their guidance on cyber incidents.
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Recommendation 3
The Army should support DoD efforts to develop
a Tier 1 cyber incident response exercise.
The 2016 report, GAO-16-574, contended that DoD
does not have a Tier 1 exercise that fully addresses a
complex DSCA cyber response scenario. The report
also rebuffed DoD claims that the existing Cyber
Guard exercises met the intentions of a Tier 1 exercise, with the GAO noting that these exercises are
also used for the certification of military cyber teams,
which limits the flexibility to address training requirements. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the
Armed Forces of the United States, notes that for Tier 1
events, “The desired end state in integrating a diverse
audience in a joint training environment is to identify core competencies, procedural disconnects, and
common ground to achieve U.S. unity of effort.”148 The
Army should support the GAO’s recommendation to
improve the visibility of Army Reserve component
forces in cyber incident response processes. The Army
may also play a significant role in developing a Tier
1 cyber exercise through its role as Executive Agent
for DoD Cyber Ranges as well as development and
acquisition lead for the Persistent Cyberspace Training Environment.
Recommendation 4
The Army and DoD should develop a prioritization process to balance the contributions of Reserve
component cyber units over the range of military
operations.
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Given the myriad responsibilities of USCYBERCOM and state governments, how will Reserve components prioritize their utilization of scarce military
cyberspace resources if attacks occur simultaneously
across multiple mission areas? Expectations for DoD
missions alone include network defense, offensive
cyber, Service and combatant command support, and
DSCA. It is not in the best interests of national security
that the assignment of Reserve component cyber force
activity remains arbitrary and capricious, especially
when one considers the speed at which cyberspace
activities occur. The Army should work with the other
Service cyberspace component commands and DoD to
develop and optimize force balance solutions through
existing large-scale exercises (such as Cyber Guard)
that could be used as heuristics during crises.
Recommendation 5
The Army G-3/5/7 and the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
(ASA(ALT)) should catalog and leverage the resources
of state and private cyber ranges with which ARNG
units are developing partnerships.
In March 2016, the Secretary of the Army was
officially designated as the DoD Executive Agent for
Cyber Training Ranges, who in turn delegated the task
to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7.149 Also,
the Army’s chief acquisition leader, the ASA(ALT),
has ultimate responsibility to ensure the development
of the DoD Persistent Cyberspace Training Environment. Both of these efforts may benefit by utilizing
existing and planned state-sponsored cyber ranges
discussed earlier in this monograph. Partnerships
with these ranges could provide ready access to leading edge private sector technology at geographically
diverse locations.
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Recommendation 6
State emergency response plans should identify
the National Guard capabilities available to address
cyber incidents.
As presented in table 6, a sampling of emergency
response plans from 11 states and the District of
Columbia showed that only one plan contained any
details on the ARNG cyber capabilities available to the
governor and other state authorities. At the very least,
these plans should list the location and skills of ARNG
cyber units trained and certified in cyber defense
operations; such an approach is consistent with guidance from the NGA.150 To support this process, the
NGB could develop and provide “boilerplate” information—such as the basic description of Defensive
Cyberspace Operations Elements and cyber protection
teams―to serve as the core input to the plans. It can be
refined by the state adjutant general staff to highlight
any unique aspects of a particular state’s ARNG cyber
force.
Recommendation 7
The NGB should conduct stakeholder management for the tasks and activities assigned to National
Guard cyber units.
As discussed herein, there are myriad assignments
that ARNG cyber units are able to fulfill for a diverse
group of stakeholders—state governments, ARCYBER, USCYBERCOM, DHS, and private industry,
to name a few. Each stakeholder has requirements,
expectations, and interests that may conflict with those
of other stakeholders. Collectively, these tacit obligations most likely exceed the capability and capacity of
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the ARNG to deliver. The NGB should identify these
stakeholders as well as their unique desires and determine how to achieve the best balance of utilization to
meet the collective needs of all stakeholders. This process should include a robust communication forum
amongst the stakeholders and methods to help the
group determine not only what ARNG cyber units are
capable of doing, but also what they should be doing
to best leverage their unique potential.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in
all areas of modern life. The continuing development
of Army and DoD Reserve component cyberspace
units can leverage the capabilities and experience of
industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security.
Current efforts to integrate cyber Reserve components
appear to be sufficient for certain specific applications,
but the Nation has yet to benefit from the potential
synergy offered by an optimized blend of these capabilities. Granted, some of the issues identified here
may be common to other applications of Reserve component forces. However, the negative impacts may
be more significant for cyber units due to the ethereal
nature of cyberspace operations that are far less intuitive than those occurring in the physical world. In
the end, it would be regrettable if well-qualified cyber
forces were not brought to bear to help ameliorate a
crisis simply because leaders and their staffs were
ignorant of their existence.
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